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Background: In the Netherlands a successful MRSA Search and Destroy policy is applied in healthcare institutes.
We determined the effect of an adjustment in the MRSA Search and Destroy policy for patients in the outpatient
clinic on the MRSA transmission to health care workers (HCW).
Methods: In June 2008 an adjustment in the policy for outpatients was introduced in a large teaching hospital.
Following this adjustment MRSA positive patients and patients at risk could be seen and treated applying general
precautions, without additional protective measures. Also, disinfection of the room after the patient had left was
abandoned. To monitor the effect of this policy on the transmission of MRSA all physicians and health care workers
of the outpatient clinic were screened for MRSA carriage repeatedly.
Results: Before the introduction of the adjusted policy all physicians and HCW of the outpatient clinic were
screened (=0-measurement, n = 1,073). None of them was found to be MRSA positive. After introduction of the
policy in June 2008 the screening was repeated in October 2008 (n = 1,170) and April 2009 (n = 1,128). In April 2009
one health care worker was MRSA positive resulting in a mean prevalence of 0.09%. This is lower than the known
prevalence in HCW. The health care worker was colonized with the livestock-related Spa type t011. As far as we
could verify, no patients with this Spa-type had been cared for by the health care worker.
Conclusions: The adjusted MRSA policy did not lead to detectable transmission of MRSA to HCW and was
associated with less disturbances in the work flow.
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Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is one
of the leading pathogens causing infections in patients ad-
mitted to healthcare institutes all over the world. To pre-
vent transmission of MSRA in healthcare institutes, a
stringent ‘Search and Destroy (S&D) policy’ is applied in
the Netherlands and Scandinavian Countries [1]. This pol-
icy focuses on isolation of MRSA carriers and of patients
at increased risk for MRSA carriage, wearing of personal
protective equipment (PPE) by Health Care Workers* Correspondence: mvrijen@amphia.nl
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article, unless otherwise stated.(HCW), and disinfection of the room after discharge of
these patients. The national guideline gives the advice to
take these preventive measures for outpatients if it is to be
expected that intensive physical contact between HCW
and patient would occur during the visit [1]. Intensive
contact is specified as ‘contact with a significant opportun-
ity for transmission’, for example during undressing of the
patient or physical contact with contaminated body sites,
like wound inspection. This recommendation is not very
easy to apply as it cannot always be predicted what kind of
contact will occur.
Traditionally, MRSA was considered to be a healthcare-
acquired pathogen (HA-MRSA) and therefore the major
risk group were patients that had been admitted to aed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
tp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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two new entities emerged. First, in patients without any
relationship with healthcare institutes, the so-called
Community-acquired MRSA (CA-MRSA) [2,3]. Second, a
reservoir for MRSA emerged in animals, in particular in
pigs and veal calves, called the livestock-associated MRSA
(LA-MRSA) [4-8]. After its emergence, the risk factor ‘dir-
ect contact with living pigs and veal calves’ was added to
the national MRSA guideline in 2006 [1]. The first LA-
MRSA in The Netherlands were found in 2003 and by the
end of 2011, 39% of all newly identified MRSA strains in
humans in the Netherlands already belonged to this vari-
ant [9]. This increase of LA-MRSA, which is mainly a
problem for hospitals in areas with high pig and/or veal
calf densities, results in a considerable disturbance of the
process of care on the outpatient clinic, in particular when
the patient reports to be at increased risk for MRSA, while
he/she is already in the outpatient clinic.
The Amphia hospital in the south of the Netherlands
has many pig farms in the catchment area (approximately
7000) [10,11]. The flow of patients on the outpatient clinic
was mainly hindered by the disinfection of the entire room
after the visit of a MRSA positive or patient at risk for
MRSA carriage following the national MRSA guideline
(a.o. patients that have been admitted to a hospital abroad
or have been in contact with pigs/veal calves) [1]. Analysis
showed that the major part of the visits from MRSA posi-
tive or suspected patients were visits made by patients
with contact with pigs/veal calves and by patients without
a known risk factor (Figure 1). Due to these logistic prob-
lems an adjustment of the policy was considered. It was
known that from 2002 until 2006 16 outpatients were un-
expectedly found to be MRSA positive by clinical cultures.
No infection control measures had been taken while visit-
ing to outpatient clinic. Contract tracing among 211
HCW showed that none of them was found to carry
MRSA. Based on this finding we decided to adjust the
S&D policy for MRSA positive and outpatients at riskFigure 1 Visits of MRSA positive patients to the outpatient clinic.under controlled conditions. Its effect on transmission to
HCW was measured by screening all HCW on the out-
patient clinic repeatedly.
Methods
Content of the adjusted policy and the departments
concerned
The adjusted policy for MRSA positive patients and pa-
tients at risk for MRSA carriage following the national
MRSA guideline was drafted in the infection committee
of the hospital and approved by the board of directors.
In the adjusted policy, the isolation measures (PPE by
HCW) and disinfection of the room after a patient visit
were abandoned. Instead of these, the importance of
universal precautions was emphasized, i.e. performing
hand hygiene, wearing PPE when contact with body
fluids and cleaning and disinfection of surfaces contami-
nated with body fluids or body excreta was anticipated.
Besides this, screening of all HCW of the outpatient de-
partments was included in the policy. There were no ad-
justments in screening policy for patients, i.e. screening
of patients at risk (a.o. patients that have been admitted
to a hospital abroad or have been in contact with pigs/
veal calves) was performed [1]. The Health Inspector
was informed about the controlled adjustment in the
MRSA policy. In June 2008, the new policy was imple-
mented on all outpatient departments, including depart-
ments for functional assessments, radiology and blood
sampling.
Periodic MRSA screening rounds of HCW
To determine transmission to HCW, all HCW on the
outpatient departments were sampled periodically. This
screening was performed before the implementation of
the adjustment (0-measurement) and two times after the
implementation, in 2008 and 2009. The target was a
compliance of 90 percent of all HCW. Samples were dir-
ectly plated on chromID S. aureus and chromID MRSA
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quently placed in a Mueller-Hinton (MH) broth supple-
mented with 6.5% sodium chloride. The overnight MH
broth was subcultured onto both chromID S. aureus and
chromID MRSA agar Plates [12].
Consequences of eventual MRSA positive HCW were
predefined. A history would be taken to identify known
risk factors for MRSA carriage [1]. Also, it would be
checked whether a MRSA positive patient with the same
Spa type had been on the department in the period pre-
ceding the positive sample. Furthermore, the observed
prevalence in the periodic screening will be compared
with the prevalence of MRSA in HCW found by Wulf
et al., being 0.15 percent [13]. If the percentage of MRSA
positive HCW during periodic screening rounds will not
exceed this percentage and no contact with MRSA posi-
tive patients with the same Spa type can be demon-
strated, the adjustment in the S&D policy for outpatients
would be considered successful.Results
Effect on transmission
In the screening round before implementation of the ad-
justed policy, there was a response rate of 83% (1073/
1296). None of the tested HCW were MRSA-positive.
After the introduction of the adjusted policy, the re-
sponse rates in the two subsequent screening rounds
were 83% (1170/1411) and 82% (1128/1376). One HCW
from the blood-sampling department was found to be
MRSA positive with a livestock-associated Spa type t011.
No known risk factor following the national MRSA
guideline was present [1]. However, she mentioned regu-
lar contact with horses and lived in a rural area, which
are sometimes mentioned as a risk factor for MRSA car-
riage [14-16]. All hospital contacts of known patients
positive for MRSA t011 (n = 39) were checked for con-
tact with the HCW in the period between negative and
positive status (October 2008 and April 2009). During
her work she had not been into contact with a patient
known to be carrier of this MRSA strain. She was suc-
cessfully decolonized using mupirocin nasal ointment
and chlorhexidine gluconate medicated soap.Discussion
The adjusted MRSA policy for outpatients did not result in
a demonstrable increase of transmission from patients to
HCW. The percentage of MRSA positive HCW found dur-
ing one of the periodical screening rounds (1/1128=0.09%)
was less than the known MRSA prevalence of 0.15% in
HCW without known risk factors described by Wulf et al.
[13]. This can be explained by the fact that the exposures
on the outpatient departments are generally short en less
intensive than in the inpatients’ clinic. The universalprecautions are probably sufficient to prevent transmission
of MRSA in these settings [17].
During the periodical screening MRSA was found in one
sample of a HCW. This HCW carried the LA-MRSA type
t011. However, she had no contact with pigs or veal calves.
During her work, she had not been into contact with a pa-
tient known to carry this type. Therefore, it is unknown
were she acquired this MRSA. However, she mentioned
regular contact with horses and lived in a rural area, which
are sometimes mentioned as a risk factor for MRSA car-
riage [14-16]. Recently, we also showed that regular con-
sumption of poultry and living in a cattle-dense area can be
associated with LA-MRSA carriage, so maybe this MRSA
was community-acquired [18]. As no exposure had oc-
curred between known MRSA positive patients carrying
t011, it can be assumed that the adjustment of the policy
did not result in this transmission.
Limitations
The limitations of this study are threefold. First, the re-
sponse rate during the periodical screening rounds was
82-83%. Ideally, all HCW have to take samples to exclude
any transmission. In theory, a HCW who does not want to
take samples, for any reason, can evade all screening
rounds. This selective evasion could be a threat because of
hidden transmissions. However, all HCW were screened
at least once after the introduction of the adjusted policy
so we consider this a minor weakness. The second limita-
tion concerns the interval of about 6 months between
screening rounds. It is possible that HCW acquired MRSA
from a patient and were carrier for a short time, which
would result in an omission of this carriage in the period-
ical screening. Theoretically, this could have resulted in
transmission from the HCW to patients. However, if this
would lead to ongoing circulation of some MRSA strains
this would have been detected in the repeated screenings.
Another possible limitation, is the lack of screening of pa-
tients that visited the room immediately after a MRSA
positive patient. Because we think the nurses and physi-
cians have the most intensive contacts with the patients,
they are more at risk to acquire the MRSA from the
MRSA positive patients than other patients. Therefore, we
screened the HCW and not the patients. However, it can
be argued that a patient can also be contaminated by the
surroundings instead of by the hands of a HCW. The en-
tire room used to be disinfected after a visit of a MRSA
positive patient. In the adjusted policy this was abandoned.
However, disinfection of the environment is also a part of
the universal precautions. Surfaces that are contaminated
with body fluids or body excreta have to be cleaned and
disinfected immediately. From our experience, we know
that MRSA will mainly be found in dust and not on
cleaned, smooth surfaces. In the adjusted policy there is
an emphasis on the importance of a clean environment,
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confirm our findings, we intend to screen some patients
that visited the same room after a MRSA positive patient.
Traditionally, the MRSA S&D policy was aimed at a
limited risk group, i.e. patients that had been admitted
to a hospital abroad. However, the proportion of this risk
group has diminished last years because of the rise of
other risk groups, mainly patients having direct contact
with pigs and/or veal calves and patients without known
risk factors (Figure 1) [11,19]. The policy must move
along these changing epidemiology. We showed that the
described pragmatic approach is a safe way to control
MRSA on the outpatient clinic. The results were taken
into account by the policy makers to include this adjust-
ment in the national guideline in 2012 [1].
Conclusions
Our study shows that universal precautions in the out-
patient department prevent widespread transmission of
MRSA to HCW. The absence of MRSA positive HCW
contributes to the final goal of the S&D policy: preven-
tion of MRSA in patients. The adjusted policy is safe for
HCW, leads to better logistics on the outpatient clinic
and it is a more patient friendly approach.
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